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1 Estimation Methodologies
1.1 Controlling for the MRTs
To obtain consistent estimates of the regressors of interest, the estimating equation should
contain controls for the multilateral resistance terms. In general, these controls are
country-specific fixed effects where each country has potentially 2 different indicator
variables: one for the country’s role as an exporter and one for the country’s role as
an importer. Taking seriously the role that these variables play in controlling for changes
in multilateral resistance requires that the fixed effects vary dynamically for a panel of
data. However, this requirement can complicate the estimation, especially non-linear es-
timation, for datasets tracking trade over numerous years. As Head and Mayer (2014)
say, “the estimation might run into computational feasibility issues due to the very large
number of resulting dummies to be estimated,” (p. 152). In some instances, the number
of dummies is so large that it impedes estimation.
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Is there a way to reduce the number of dummy variables necessary? This section
demonstrates that an alternative approach for controlling the multilateral resistance terms
leads to nearly-identical estimates for most variables of interest. In particular, this sec-
tion shows that if importer and exporter fixed effects vary not yearly but less frequently,
the coefficients and standard errors for most variables of interest are largely unaffected.
Hence, researchers can obtain consistent estimates for coefficients from the gravity equa-
tion but with a fraction of the dummy variables required to control for the multilateral
resistance terms. As a result, the computation time required to estimate parameters falls.
To demonstrate this claim, this section uses OLS to estimate the gravity equation on
subsets of the data. This section uses OLS rather than non-linear estimation methods,
owing to the speed and convenience of the former. As the controlling or not controlling for
the multilateral resistance terms is a problem distinct from the objective function used to
obtain parameter estimates (e.g., OLS vs. PPML), there is no reason to believe that the
results would differ for PPML. For each type of trade (agriculture versus manufacturing),
this section divides the available data into blocks of no more than 10 years.1 For each
block, this section reports estimation results from the gravity equation where the exporter
and importer fixed effects are interacted not with the year dummy but with a year_block
dummy. This year_block dummy groups years into a block of decreasing length. For
example, the first length is 10 years: i.e., one fixed effect each for the country as an
importer and as an exporter. The next length is 9 years: one fixed effect for each country’s
role (exporter and importer) for the first 9 years, followed by a different fixed effect for
the remaining year. The next length is 8 years: one fixed effect for each country’s role
(exporter and importer) for the first 8 years, followed by a different fixed effect for the
remaining 2 years. Once the length falls to 4 years, there are 3 fixed effects for each of
the country’s roles (exporter and importer), dividing the time span into two groups of
1The choice of 10 years is dictated by Stata’s limit of no more than 11,000 independent variables for
a regression.
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Table 1: Estimated coefficients under differing frequencies of MRT for Agriculture trade (estimated with OLS)
1980s 1990s 2000s
βˆx p-value βˆx p-value βˆx p-value βˆx p-value βˆx p-value βˆx p-value
Countries share a common currency 0.314 (0.177) 0.316 (0.18) -0.102 (0.549) -0.046 (0.79) -0.183 (0.165) -0.198 (0.14)
ln Y kit 0.128
† (0.078) 1.564 (0.597) 0.458∗∗ (0.0) -9.506∗∗ (0.003) 0.351∗∗ (0.0) -0.102
ln Y kworld,t 0.388
∗∗ (0.0) -1.053 (0.564) -0.620∗∗ (0.0) -7.421 (0.193) 0.772∗∗ (0.0) 2.518
ln Distance -1.193∗∗ (0.0) -1.206∗∗ (0.0) -1.181∗∗ (0.0) -1.209∗∗ (0.0) -1.301∗∗ (0.0) -1.306∗∗ (0.0)
Pair belongs to a Regional trade Accord 0.397∗∗ (0.002) 0.378∗∗ (0.004) 0.252∗∗ (0.0) 0.246∗∗ (0.0) 0.390∗∗ (0.0) 0.391∗∗ (0.0)
Colonizer-colonized relationship 1.415∗∗ (0.0) 1.407∗∗ (0.0) 1.457∗∗ (0.0) 1.459∗∗ (0.0) 1.475∗∗ (0.0) 1.485∗∗ (0.0)
Country pair transitioning from colonialism 0.072 (0.761) 0.089 (0.738) 0.326 (0.264) 0.292 (0.344) 0.803† (0.086) 0.785† (0.095)
Countries were colonies of same country 0.297∗∗ (0.002) 0.294∗∗ (0.002) 0.322∗∗ (0.0) 0.320∗∗ (0.0) 0.450∗∗ (0.0) 0.455∗∗ (0.0)
Countries are contiguous 0.529∗∗ (0.0) 0.513∗∗ (0.001) 1.052∗∗ (0.0) 1.051∗∗ (0.0) 1.257∗∗ (0.0) 1.257∗∗ (0.0)
Shared common or official language 0.456∗∗ (0.0) 0.465∗∗ (0.0) 0.332∗∗ (0.0) 0.346∗∗ (0.0) 0.404∗∗ (0.0) 0.410∗∗ (0.0)
Number of dummy variables per decade 1 10 1 10 1 10
Number of observations 36513 71289 58894
Number of country pairs 6921 13944 14392
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Table 2: Estimated coefficients under differing frequencies of MRT for Manufacturing trade (estimated with OLS)
1980s 1990s 2000s
βˆx p-value βˆx p-value βˆx p-value βˆx p-value βˆx p-value βˆx p-value
Countries share a common currency 1.955∗∗ (0.0) 1.937∗∗ (0.0) 1.176∗∗ (0.0) 1.204∗∗ (0.0) 0.160 (0.151) 0.159 (0.159)
ln Y kit 0.499
∗∗ (0.0) 16.837 (0.676) 0.491∗∗ (0.0) 0.286 (0.763) 0.333∗∗ (0.0) 0.016 (0.0)
ln Y kworld,t 0.775
∗∗ (0.0) -18.527 (0.695) 1.902∗∗ (0.0) -1.032 (0.684) 1.173∗∗ (0.0) -0.719 (0.0)
ln Distance -1.700∗∗ (0.0) -1.709∗∗ (0.0) -1.625∗∗ (0.0) -1.639∗∗ (0.0) -1.719∗∗ (0.0) -1.721∗∗ (0.0)
Pair belongs to a Regional trade Accord -0.129 (0.353) -0.160 (0.264) 0.326∗∗ (0.0) 0.291∗∗ (0.0) 0.540∗∗ (0.0) 0.539∗∗ (0.0)
Colonizer-colonized relationship 1.118∗∗ (0.0) 1.104∗∗ (0.0) 1.343∗∗ (0.0) 1.344∗∗ (0.0) 1.261∗∗ (0.0) 1.258∗∗ (0.0)
Country pair transitioning from colonialism -0.044 (0.86) -0.148 (0.579) 0.315 (0.113) 0.249 (0.226) 0.486† (0.051) 0.497∗ (0.047)
Countries were colonies of same country 0.436∗∗ (0.0) 0.440∗∗ (0.0) 0.676∗∗ (0.0) 0.678∗∗ (0.0) 0.728∗∗ (0.0) 0.728∗∗ (0.0)
Countries are contiguous 0.195 (0.191) 0.178 (0.242) 0.696∗∗ (0.0) 0.692∗∗ (0.0) 0.784∗∗ (0.0) 0.782∗∗ (0.0)
Shared common or official language 0.567∗∗ (0.0) 0.583∗∗ (0.0) 0.552∗∗ (0.0) 0.554∗∗ (0.0) 0.571∗∗ (0.0) 0.571∗∗ (0.0)
Number of dummy variables per decade 1 10 1 10 1 10
Number of observations 44815 107917 98961
Number of country pairs 8094 19363 21394
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four years and one group of two years. The most refined specification is interacting the
importer effect and the exporter effect with a dummy for year.
The results are in tables 1 and 2. For issues of space, only the broadest (1 fixed
effect per decade per role) and the narrowest (1 fixed effect per year per role) results
are included. Other results are available upon request. Overall, most coefficients and
standard errors change little as the number of fixed effects changes, as evidenced from
the correlations in table 3, summarizing the results in tables 1 and 2.2 The correlations
in table 3 do not carry any statistical meaning but serve merely to show whether an array
of numbers is “similar” to another array of numbers.
Table 3: Correlation between effects of trade when year block = 1 and when year block
= 10 (based on tables 1 and 2)
1980s 1990s 2000s
Agriculture (including Y kit and Y
k
world,t) 0.65 0.51 0.84
Manufacturing (including Y kit and Y
k
world,t) 0.03 0.51 0.75
Agriculture (excluding Y kit and Y
k
world,t) 0.99 0.99 0.99
Manufacturing (excluding Y kit and Y
k
world,t) 0.99 0.99 0.99
The only exceptions are the coefficients for the value of production at the country
and world level. It is not immediately clear why estimates for these variables should
respond differently than do other estimates. Output certainly fluctuates over time in
a way distinct from the fluctuations of the bilateral resistance terms (e.g., changes in
membership for multilateral regional trade accords). Changing the frequency with which
the dynamic multilateral resistance changes may have some unexpected influence on
the coefficients of output. Additionally, this paper follows the practice of Anderson
2Note that when comparing regression results across decades but within trade type and the value of
year_block implies, in some cases, noticeably different effects (e.g., the estimate coefficient for contigu-
ity). Though explaining why the effects may change over time is an interesting and important question,
it is beyond the scope of this paper.
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and Yotov (2010a) by using the importer’s fixed effect to control simultaneously for
the importer’s expenditure as well as the multilateral resistance term, a practice that
may contribute to the changing coefficients on Yit. However, the coefficient for regional
trade agreements is largely constant as the year_block dummy changes, even though
membership in trade agreements does change over time. Nonetheless, if one excludes the
coefficients for output, one can see that whether one follows a strict practice of changing
the fixed effects every year or a looser practice of changing the fixed effects less frequently,
the estimated coefficients for the variables of interest change little.
1.2 Serial Correlation
A concern with panels, particularly those that span decades, is the possibility for serial
correlation of errors to bias coefficient and standard error estimates. Taking first dif-
ferences of the data and estimating a model on those differences is a straight-forward
way to remove the serial correlation, provided that the model is linear (e.g., pooled
OLS). First differencing is not an available option for a non-linear model such as PPML.
To understand why, note that the estimating equation for PPML is of the form yit =
exp (x′itβ) + υit and suppose that υit = υit−1 + it where it is a mean zero, identically
and independently distributed disturbance term. First differencing the estimating equa-
tion for such a series of data would imply estimating a vector of coefficients from the
following estimating equation in order to eliminate the serial correlation in the error
term: ∆yit = exp (x
′
itβ) − exp
(
x′it−1β
)
+ it. That is to say, this estimation procedure
requires estimating β from a difference of exponentials, not an exponential of differences.
Estimating β from such a regression would eliminate any contamination from the se-
rial correlation of errors, but is a far more difficult task than doing so in a pooled OLS
framework.
To address concerns about serial correlation in the data, this paper will appeal to the
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fixed-T , large-N asymptotics identified by Wooldridge (2002). If the cross-sectional size is
large relative to the number of years covered by the data, then a pooled OLS estimator “is
fully robust to arbitrary heteroskedasticity - conditional or unconditional - and arbitrary
serial correlation across time (again, conditional or unconditional),” (pp 175-176). If the
cross-sectional size is large relative to the number of years covered by the data, then a
pooled Poisson estimation with a robust, sandwich-form variance covariance matrix will
yield consistent coefficient estimates and standard errors “robust to the presence of serial
correlation in the score and arbitrary conditional variances,” without assuming that the
data truly follow a Poisson distribution. (p. 670). In this paper, the number of years or
T ranges from 32 to 36. The size of the cross-section, N , is the number of country pairs
and ranges from 12,820 to 24,954. The values of N and T arguably satisfy the condition
of fixed-T and large-N . All standard errors come from a fully-robust, sandwich form,
variance-covariance matrix.
2 Other bilateral resistance terms
Focusing on the PPML estimates over the OLS estimates, the estimated coefficients of
bilateral resistance are larger in magnitude for manufacturing trade than for agricultural
trade. The exceptions to this pattern are distance (as mentioned earlier); the colonizer-
colonized variable (for a pair of countries, one country was a former colonizer of the other
country); the transitional colony variable (a country pair where one country has gained
independence from a colonial empire while the other country has not); and the generic
common currency variable for homogeneous integration. These variables are significant
for agriculture while all, except the transitional colonialism variable, are insignificant for
manufacturing. Overall, manufacturing trade and agricultural trade appear to have very
different determinants. Table 4 shows that for a fixed regression model, the correlation be-
tween coefficients across trade types suggests a weakly positive association (agricultural:
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0.497) or a nearly non-existent association (manufacturing: 0.263). Hence, the results
bear out the message of Anderson and Yotov (2010a), Anderson and Yotov (2010b), and
Anderson and Yotov (2012). Trade costs and country-pair features that mitigate those
trade costs differ substantially across the types of goods traded.
Table 4: Correlation between all coefficients in columns 3 & 4 of tables 14 and 15
Ag PPML Manuf OLS Manuf PPML
Ag OLS 0.831 0.497
Ag PPML 0.263
Manuf OLS 0.703
Larger estimates of bilateral resistances for manufacturing trade than for agricultural
trade may not be expected for three reasons. First, agricultural products tend to be
homogeneous across producers. Hence, the gravity equation, often motivated through the
supposition of a CES objective function conveying a “love-of-variety”-like motivation, may
be less appropriate for agricultural goods than for manufacturing goods. A consequence
of the homogeneity in product characteristics is a greater emphasis on price for customers
when selecting a producer rather than other considerations (e.g., a common language).
Second, a large share of agricultural products may rely more heavily on natural en-
dowments which tend to be country-specific in ways distinct from a comparable share of
manufactured goods.3 As endowments of natural resources tend to be country-specific,
the flow of trade within a given country pair may depend more heavily on particular
aspects of one of those countries (through natural endowments) than on a characteris-
tic of the pair itself.4 Consequently, the greater importance of country-specific factors
3I thank a referee for pointing out this distinction.
4Heerman et al. (2015) propose a model that recognizes the ability of changes in a single exporter’s
trade costs to alter the ratio of the market shares of two other exporters in some other market, a
phenomenon labeled as a violation of the “independence of irrelevant exporters,” (IIE) an international
trade counterpart to the independence of irrelevant alternatives property commonly used in the discrete
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means controls for the MRTs will absorb these effects in the gravity equation, leaving less
explanatory power (and smaller bilateral resistance coefficients) for agricultural trade.
A third reason, that also explains the larger effect of a common currency for agri-
cultural trade than for manufacturing trade, arises from the greater emphasis on price
for agricultural than for manufacturing trade. A worldwide currency such as the U.S.
dollar is generally the currency used for pricing and then purchasing agricultural goods
(see Pick and Carter (1994)). If neither importer nor exporter use the currency in which
the agricultural goods are priced, exchange rate uncertainty can affect both buyer and
seller (in contrast to affecting the seller for producer-currency pricing or the buyer for
local-currency pricing). As the trade-enhancing effects of a common currency are tradi-
tionally believed to arise from the elimination of exchange rate uncertainty, the removal
of uncertainty from both ends of the transaction should increase trade to a larger extent
than does removing uncertainty from just one end of the transaction (see Anderson and
van Wincoop (2004)).
Table 5: Correlation between non-currency union coefficients
Ag PPML Manuf OLS Manuf PPML
Ag OLS 0.902 0.504
Ag PPML -0.483
Manuf OLS 0.307
3 Individual manufacturing industries
The results in the previous section indicate distinct differences between the determinants
of agricultural trade and the determinants of manufacturing trade. The results also show
choice literature. The violation of IIE owing to the importance of natural resources in a single country is
a point that Heerman et al. (2015) justify by citing Eaton and Kortum (2002) and their caution against
using their Ricardian model in a context where natural resources are critical for determining trade.
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that there exists a common ranking of currency unions, independent of regression model,
by the magnitude of their effect on trade.
Hence, this section will explore the robustness of this ranking within manufacturing
trade by examining four industries: textiles, machinery, chemicals, and food, tobacco,
and beverages. These are industries for which the value of production can be computed
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Table 6: Estimated coefficients for chemical trade
(1) (2) (3) (4)
OLS PPML OLS PPML
βˆx p-value βˆx p-value βˆx p-value βˆx p-value
East Caribbean Currency Union 1.428∗ (0.043) 4.845∗∗ (0.0)
West African Economic & Monetary Union 1.802∗∗ (0.0) 2.174∗ (0.018)
Central African Economic & Monetary Union 3.333∗∗ (0.0) 3.233∗∗ (0.0)
Australia zone 2.000∗∗ (0.0) 2.493∗∗ (0.0)
Dollarized zone -0.111 (0.669) -0.841∗∗ (0.0)
Euro zone 0.178 (0.107) -0.045 (0.628)
Krone zone (Denmark) 4.328∗∗ (0.0) 5.574∗∗ (0.0)
India-Bhutan -0.068 (0.807) 2.522∗∗ (0.0)
Singapore-Brunei 2.611∗∗ (0.0) 1.802∗∗ (0.002)
Countries share a common currency 0.517∗∗ (0.0) -0.118 (0.211)
ln Y kit 0.318
∗∗ (0.0) 0.199∗∗ (0.008) 0.315∗∗ (0.0) 0.534∗∗ (0.0)
ln Y kworld,t 1.732
∗∗ (0.0) 1.207 (0.998) 1.747∗∗ (0.0) 1.394∗∗ (0.0)
ln Distance -1.744∗∗ (0.0) -0.968∗∗ (0.0) -1.757∗∗ (0.0) -0.958∗∗ (0.0)
Pair belongs to a Regional trade Accord 0.353∗∗ (0.0) 0.240∗∗ (0.003) 0.338∗∗ (0.0) 0.238∗∗ (0.004)
Colonizer-colonized relationship 1.077∗∗ (0.0) -0.344∗ (0.044) 1.079∗∗ (0.0) -0.049 (0.794)
Country pair transitioning from colonialism 0.605∗ (0.034) -0.061 (0.787) 0.632∗ (0.03) -0.035 (0.871)
Countries were colonies of same country 0.592∗∗ (0.0) 0.279∗ (0.036) 0.591∗∗ (0.0) 0.259∗ (0.045)
Countries are contiguous 0.743∗∗ (0.0) 0.147∗ (0.045) 0.751∗∗ (0.0) 0.158∗ (0.045)
Shared common or official language 0.579∗∗ (0.0) 0.311∗∗ (0.008) 0.565∗∗ (0.0) 0.297∗ (0.011)
Number of observations 107355 149502 107355 149502
Number of country pairs 12820 16984 12820 16984
11
Table 7: Estimated coefficients for food, beverage, & tobacco trade
(1) (2) (3) (4)
OLS PPML OLS PPML
βˆx p-value βˆx p-value βˆx p-value βˆx p-value
East Caribbean Currency Union 1.942∗ (0.025) 2.818∗∗ (0.001)
West African Economic & Monetary Union 0.534† (0.057) 0.031 (0.94)
Central African Economic & Monetary Union 2.182∗∗ (0.0) 1.387∗∗ (0.008)
Australia zone 2.269∗∗ (0.0) 1.426∗∗ (0.001)
Dollarized zone 0.491† (0.064) 0.508∗∗ (0.004)
Euro zone 0.289∗ (0.012) 0.182∗ (0.042)
Krone zone (Denmark) 3.520∗∗ (0.002) 2.352∗∗ (0.003)
India-Bhutan 2.205∗∗ (0.0) 3.071∗∗ (0.0)
Singapore-Brunei 2.747∗∗ (0.0) 2.737∗∗ (0.0)
Countries share a common currency 0.488∗∗ (0.0) 0.169† (0.053)
ln Y kit 0.199
∗∗ (0.0) 0.340∗∗ (0.0) 0.197∗∗ (0.0) 0.328∗∗ (0.0)
ln Y kworld,t 1.474
∗∗ (0.0) 0.831∗∗ (0.0) 1.480∗∗ (0.0) 0.796 (0.755)
ln Distance -1.558∗∗ (0.0) -0.863∗∗ (0.0) -1.562∗∗ (0.0) -0.833∗∗ (0.0)
Pair belongs to a Regional trade Accord 0.193∗∗ (0.0) 0.466∗∗ (0.0) 0.191∗∗ (0.0) 0.508∗∗ (0.0)
Colonizer-colonized relationship 1.336∗∗ (0.0) 0.326∗ (0.025) 1.328∗∗ (0.0) 0.671∗∗ (0.0)
Country pair transitioning from colonialism 0.229 (0.37) -0.542∗ (0.013) 0.248 (0.34) -0.406† (0.061)
Countries were colonies of same country 0.610∗∗ (0.0) 0.468∗∗ (0.0) 0.617∗∗ (0.0) 0.594∗∗ (0.0)
Countries are contiguous 0.933∗∗ (0.0) 0.510∗∗ (0.0) 0.934∗∗ (0.0) 0.537∗∗ (0.0)
Shared common or official language 0.562∗∗ (0.0) 0.404∗∗ (0.0) 0.557∗∗ (0.0) 0.399∗∗ (0.0)
Number of observations 107786 155409 107786 155409
Number of country pairs 13729 17817 13729 17817
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Table 8: Estimated coefficients for machinery trade
(1) (2) (3) (4)
OLS PPML OLS PPML
βˆx p-value βˆx p-value βˆx p-value βˆx p-value
West African Economic & Monetary Union 2.005∗∗ (0.0) 2.662∗∗ (0.0)
Central African Economic & Monetary Union 3.528∗∗ (0.0) 3.759∗∗ (0.0)
Australia zone 2.546∗∗ (0.0) 2.933∗∗ (0.0)
Dollarized zone -0.844∗∗ (0.003) -1.971∗∗ (0.0)
Euro zone -0.344∗∗ (0.002) -0.108 (0.143)
Krone zone (Denmark) 3.556∗∗ (0.0) 5.133∗∗ (0.0)
India-Bhutan 1.672∗∗ (0.0) 3.357∗∗ (0.0)
Singapore-Brunei 1.312∗∗ (0.0) 1.239∗∗ (0.0)
Countries share a common currency 0.165 (0.205) -0.155∗ (0.038)
ln Y kit 0.381
∗∗ (0.0) 0.766∗∗ (0.0) 0.381∗∗ (0.0) 0.771∗∗ (0.0)
ln Y kworld,t 1.302
∗∗ (0.0) 0.466∗∗ (0.002) 1.312∗∗ (0.0) 0.464∗∗ (0.002)
ln Distance -1.563∗∗ (0.0) -0.639∗∗ (0.0) -1.578∗∗ (0.0) -0.651∗∗ (0.0)
Pair belongs to a Regional trade Accord 0.349∗∗ (0.0) 0.730∗∗ (0.0) 0.340∗∗ (0.0) 0.716∗∗ (0.0)
Colonizer-colonized relationship 1.073∗∗ (0.0) 0.053 (0.714) 1.079∗∗ (0.0) 0.091 (0.575)
Country pair transitioning from colonialism -0.132 (0.704) 0.115 (0.786) -0.120 (0.733) 0.078 (0.857)
Countries were colonies of same country 0.652∗∗ (0.0) 0.220 (0.115) 0.641∗∗ (0.0) 0.221 (0.118)
Countries are contiguous 0.732∗∗ (0.0) 0.478∗∗ (0.0) 0.718∗∗ (0.0) 0.462∗∗ (0.0)
Shared common or official language 0.683∗∗ (0.0) 0.227∗∗ (0.001) 0.670∗∗ (0.0) 0.226∗∗ (0.001)
Number of observations 119268 151572 119268 151572
Number of country pairs 14050 17045 14050 17045
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Table 9: Estimated coefficients for textile trade
(1) (2) (3) (4)
OLS PPML OLS PPML
βˆx p-value βˆx p-value βˆx p-value βˆx p-value
East Caribbean Currency Union 0.209 (0.727) -0.588 (0.476)
West African Economic & Monetary Union 1.171∗∗ (0.0) 1.453∗∗ (0.007)
Central African Economic & Monetary Union 2.534∗∗ (0.002) 2.216∗∗ (0.002)
Australia zone 2.084∗∗ (0.0) 2.122∗∗ (0.001)
Dollarized zone 0.308 (0.363) 0.364 (0.652)
Euro zone -0.481∗∗ (0.0) -0.147† (0.059)
Krone zone (Denmark) 4.199∗∗ (0.0) 4.773∗∗ (0.0)
India-Bhutan -2.125∗∗ (0.0) -0.019 (0.975)
Singapore-Brunei 3.100∗∗ (0.0) 3.150∗∗ (0.0)
Countries share a common currency 0.002 (0.988) -0.140† (0.076)
ln Y kit 0.403
∗∗ (0.0) 0.715∗∗ (0.0) 0.400∗∗ (0.0) 0.735∗∗ (0.0)
ln Y kworld,t 1.913
∗∗ (0.0) 0.809 (0.0) 1.928∗∗ (0.0) 0.762 (0.0)
ln Distance -1.524∗∗ (0.0) -0.891∗∗ (0.0) -1.533∗∗ (0.0) -0.954∗∗ (0.0)
Pair belongs to a Regional trade Accord 0.582∗∗ (0.0) 0.627∗∗ (0.0) 0.581∗∗ (0.0) 0.542∗∗ (0.0)
Colonizer-colonized relationship 1.263∗∗ (0.0) 0.283 (0.247) 1.247∗∗ (0.0) 0.358 (0.192)
Country pair transitioning from colonialism 0.513† (0.094) -0.820∗∗ (0.005) 0.534† (0.085) -0.803∗∗ (0.006)
Countries were colonies of same country 0.540∗∗ (0.0) -0.053 (0.711) 0.535∗∗ (0.0) -0.068 (0.635)
Countries are contiguous 0.721∗∗ (0.0) 0.357∗∗ (0.001) 0.748∗∗ (0.0) 0.326∗∗ (0.002)
Shared common or official language 0.693∗∗ (0.0) 0.431∗∗ (0.0) 0.680∗∗ (0.0) 0.429∗∗ (0.0)
Number of observations 112134 155076 112134 155076
Number of country pairs 14261 17717 14261 17717
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over time and across countries using data from the World Bank’s World Development
Indicators. The years covered range from 1991 to 2006. Although these industries all
belong to the manufacturing sector, textiles and food, beverage, and tobacco rely on in-
puts more closely linked with agricultural production than do the machinery and chem-
icals industries. This subsection and its results closely resemble those in Anderson and
Yotov (2010b), but pays particular attention to the importance of currency union effects.
Owing to difficulties in obtaining convergence for the PPML estimates, the MRTs are
time-invariant fixed effects where each country has up to two fixed effects for the two
roles it might play (importer and exporter). There is a separate, year fixed effect.
Table 10: Correlation between currency union coefficients across estimation procedures
(OLS versus PPML)
Chemicals Food, beverage, & tobacco Machinery Textiles
0.773 0.884 0.871 0.912
Food, beverage, and tobacco and textiles have currency union effects that tend to
be the most robust regardless of estimation technique (see table 10). The correlation
between the OLS and PPML results for food et al is 0.884 while the correlation for textiles
is 0.912. The correlation for machinery, however, is also quite high: 0.871. Chemicals
has a weaker correlation, 0.773. Note that except for chemicals, these correlations are
roughly equal to or larger the correlation between the PPML and OLS currency union
coefficients for agricultural and manufacturing trade (compare table 10 with table ??).
Hence, disaggregating trade can lead to a reliable ranking, independent of estimating
method, of the effects of individual currency unions.
How do the results of individual industries compare with the estimates for agricultural
trade and manufacturing trade overall? Consider the PPML results as the previous
section established the greater plausibility of PPML over OLS. Overall and unsurprisingly,
the coefficients of individual manufacturing industries are more closely correlated with
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Table 11: Correlation for all coefficients between Agriculture, Manufacturing, and indi-
vidual industries
Chemicals Food, beverage, & tobacco Machinery Textiles
Agriculture 0.42 0.492 0.498 0.563
Manufacturing 0.956 0.849 0.96 0.632
the coefficients from manufacturing trade (see table 11). Textiles is an exception as it
appears to be nearly equally and weakly related to both agricultural trade overall and
manufacturing trade overall.
Table 12: Correlation for currency union coefficients between Agriculture, Manufacturing,
and individual industries
Chemicals Food, beverage, & tobacco Machinery Textiles
Agriculture 0.291 0.308 0.373 0.448
Manufacturing 0.94 0.762 0.952 0.473
The closeness between manufacturing and individual manufacturing industries contin-
ues when examining just the coefficients of the currency unions (see table 12). Looking at
individual unions and industries, the UEMOA, CEMAC, Kroner zone, and India-Bhutan
generally have larger and more significant coefficients in chemicals and manufacturing
than in the agricultural-related industries. The coefficients for manufacturing are neg-
ative or insignificant for the dollar and euro zones, respectively, but are positive and
significant for food et al.
Table 13: Correlation for non-currency union coefficients between Agriculture, Manufac-
turing, and individual industries
Chemicals Food, beverage, & tobacco Machinery Textiles
Agriculture 0.585 0.926 0.731 0.876
Manufacturing 0.832 0.901 0.911 0.958
The correlation between other covariates for individual industries and the larger cat-
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egories of trade offers a slightly different story (see table 13). The correlation between
manufacturing trade and each of the individual industries is high. However, the corre-
lations between agricultural trade and each of food et al and textiles are also high. As
both of these manufacturing industries rely on agricultural inputs to a large extent, the
high correlation may not be too surprising. However, the correlation of 0.731 between
machinery and agriculture is less easily explained. Food et al appears to be the industry
best-explained by the gravity model in the sense that the coefficients of the regressors
are generally larger and more significant than are the regressors for the other industries.
Colonial-era variables tend to be the most important for food et al than for the other
industries. The regional trade agreement indicator has a large coefficient for machinery
and textiles, though the estimate for food et al coefficient is also sizable.
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Table 14: Estimated coefficients for agricultural trade
(1) (2) (3) (4)
OLS PPML OLS PPML
βˆx p-value βˆx p-value βˆx p-value βˆx p-value
East Caribbean Currency Union -0.516 (0.245) -0.308 (0.76)
West African Economic & Monetary Union 0.097 (0.771) 1.096∗ (0.022)
Central African Economic & Monetary Union -1.341∗∗ (0.009) -0.814 (0.248)
Rand zone 0.137 (0.87) 1.967∗ (0.043)
Australia zone -0.385 (0.607) -0.460 (0.283)
Dollarized zone 0.466 (0.161) 0.588∗∗ (0.008)
Euro zone 0.347∗∗ (0.008) 0.238∗∗ (0.002)
Krone zone (Denmark) 2.986∗∗ (0.0) 3.447∗∗ (0.0)
India-Bhutan 0.858 (0.595) 2.153∗∗ (0.007)
Countries share a common currency -0.035 (0.78) 0.275∗∗ (0.002)
ln Y kit 0.406
∗∗ (0.0) 0.402∗∗ (0.0) 0.407∗∗ (0.0) 0.506∗∗ (0.0)
ln Y kworld,t 0.311
∗∗ (0.0) 0.624∗∗ (0.0) 0.312∗∗ (0.0) 0.398∗∗ (0.0)
ln Distance -1.225∗∗ (0.0) -0.921∗∗ (0.0) -1.225∗∗ (0.0) -0.944∗∗ (0.0)
Pair belongs to a Regional trade Accord 0.363∗∗ (0.0) 0.472∗∗ (0.0) 0.356∗∗ (0.0) 0.439∗∗ (0.0)
Colonizer-colonized relationship 1.480∗∗ (0.0) 0.566∗∗ (0.0) 1.472∗∗ (0.0) 0.803∗∗ (0.0)
Countries are colonies of the same country 3.187∗∗ (0.0) 2.093∗∗ (0.001) 3.253∗∗ (0.0) 2.141∗∗ (0.0)
Country pair transitioning from colonialism 0.400† (0.077) -0.764∗ (0.043) 0.425† (0.063) -0.738† (0.051)
Countries were colonies of same country 0.357∗∗ (0.0) 0.279∗∗ (0.009) 0.367∗∗ (0.0) 0.280∗ (0.01)
Countries are contiguous 1.012∗∗ (0.0) 0.498∗∗ (0.0) 1.031∗∗ (0.0) 0.511∗∗ (0.0)
Shared common or official language 0.388∗∗ (0.0) -0.019 (0.841) 0.380∗∗ (0.0) -0.025 (0.783)
Number of observations 175365 288366 175365 288366
Number of country pairs 17461 24954 17461 24954
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Table 15: Estimated coefficients for manufacturing trade
(1) (2) (3) (4)
OLS PPML OLS PPML
βˆx p-value βˆx p-value βˆx p-value βˆx p-value
East Caribbean Currency Union 2.321∗∗ (0.0) 3.227∗∗ (0.0)
West African Economic & Monetary Union 1.905∗∗ (0.0) 2.016∗∗ (0.0)
Central African Economic & Monetary Union 1.479∗∗ (0.002) 1.829∗∗ (0.0)
Rand zone 0.397 (0.317) 1.285∗∗ (0.005)
Australia zone 1.898∗ (0.032) 2.340∗∗ (0.0)
Dollarized zone 0.055 (0.772) -0.893∗∗ (0.002)
Euro zone -0.841∗∗ (0.0) -0.023 (0.703)
Krone zone (Denmark) 3.468∗∗ (0.0) 4.373∗∗ (0.0)
India-Bhutan 2.780† (0.06) 3.156∗∗ (0.0)
Countries share a common currency 0.753∗∗ (0.0) -0.055 (0.356)
ln Y kit 0.376
∗∗ (0.0) 0.613∗∗ (0.0) 0.436∗∗ (0.0) 0.736∗∗ (0.0)
ln Y kworld,t 1.079
∗∗ (0.0) 1.098∗∗ (0.0) 1.172∗∗ (0.0) 0.736∗∗ (0.0)
ln Distance -1.671∗∗ (0.0) -0.738∗∗ (0.0) -1.677∗∗ (0.0) -0.751∗∗ (0.0)
Pair belongs to a Regional trade Accord 0.414∗∗ (0.0) 0.619∗∗ (0.0) 0.427∗∗ (0.0) 0.584∗∗ (0.0)
Colonizer-colonized relationship 1.280∗∗ (0.0) 0.151 (0.255) 1.291∗∗ (0.0) 0.234 (0.121)
Countries are colonies of the same country 0.326 (0.438) -3.633∗∗ (0.0) 0.326 (0.412) -3.619∗∗ (0.0)
Country pair transitioning from colonialism 0.277 (0.112) -0.431∗ (0.04) 0.287 (0.1) -0.397† (0.062)
Countries were colonies of same country 0.653∗∗ (0.0) 0.337∗∗ (0.0) 0.645∗∗ (0.0) 0.335∗∗ (0.0)
Countries are contiguous 0.629∗∗ (0.0) 0.450∗∗ (0.0) 0.607∗∗ (0.0) 0.454∗∗ (0.0)
Shared common or official language 0.560∗∗ (0.0) 0.275∗∗ (0.0) 0.555∗∗ (0.0) 0.270∗∗ (0.0)
Number of observations 254871 268571 254871 268571
Number of country pairs 23579 24954 23579 24954
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